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This paper discusses the volatility spillovers between the Greek debt crisis and the
Cypriot financial crisis. Cyprus was in the spotlight of financial markets due to significant problems stemming from the banking sector, which were dealt with by EU
regulators with a bail-in on bank deposits. The current analysis aims to shed light on
the reasons behind implementing this novel approach to bank distress. The study uses
a Dynamic Conditional Correlation model on the returns of the stock markets of the
two countries, which shows strong spillover effects during the period leading up to the
2013 Cypriot crisis, but a significant decrease of these effects from then on. The results
confirm the close interdependence of the Greek and Cypriot economies before 2013
and show that this interdependence was limited from that point onwards. This would
indicate that since the risk of contagion to the Eurozone had diminished, regulators
could test the bail-in solution in Cyprus in 2015. The current work contributes to the
discussion on the interdependence of European economies. The paper’s findings can
also be applied to other emerging European economies.

Keywords

Greek debt crisis, Cypriot financial crisis, contagion,
DCC model, bail-in, bank distress

JEL Classification

G01, G15, F37

INTRODUCTION
The 2008 Great Financial Crisis (GFC) triggered an unexpected worldwide turmoil and resulted in a series of economic shocks. International
markets experienced a new economic framework, the consequences of
which permanently changed the financial sector. During this turbulent period, Cyprus was forced to implement a new banking practice,
bail-in, after suffering significant negative spillovers from the Greek
debt crisis, which started in 2010. Under the pressure of its European
partners, the Cypriot government was forced to levy all bank deposits
above EUR 100,000 by 40%.
The current study aims to measure, quantify, and compare the
co-movements between the Greek debt crisis and the Cypriot financial crisis. Besides, the paper tries to examine whether there exists a strong contagion phenomenon between these two economies.
To achieve this, Engle’s Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC)
model (Engle, 2002) is employed, which is better suited to measure
volatility in asymmetric data (Castagneto-Gissey & Nivorozhkin,
2016). The present work aims to show that the bail-in solution was
implemented in Cyprus only after authorities had ensured that any
financial distress would not be transmitted to the rest of Europe.
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This is because the interdependence between Cyprus and Greece, its main trading partner in the
EU, was significantly limited.
This paper contributes to three aspects of the relevant literature. First, it demonstrates how the DCC
model can be used to quantify the volatility spillovers between two economies. Second, the paper investigates the relationships and the covariance between the stock markets of two developing EU economies,
namely Greece and Cyprus. Third, the current research examines the contagion outcome of implementing the bail-in solution in a Eurozone economy.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Research on measuring cross-market dependence,
correlations between stock markets, or financial
contagion is not new but can be traced back to
the past. Financial contagion is commonly defined as negative shocks or spillovers transmitted across countries, especially during crisis. In
terms of policy responses, spillover effects are important in evaluating the applicability of authorities’ different measures. Castagneto-Gissey and
Nivorozhkin (2016) examine the transmission
paths from the Russian stock market to 18 major
global markets after implementing the 2014–2015
sanctions against Russia. They find limited evidence of negative spillovers in returns and present volatility spillovers, particularly in emerging
economies.
The first efforts to study the contagion effect confirmed its existence after a financial crash (Calvo
& Reinhart, 1996; Lee & Kim, 1993; King &
Wadhwani, 1990). There is an ongoing debate on
this phenomenon since some researchers confirm
the increased correlation following financial crises, while others present doubts. The Asian crisis
was the first widely examined case of international contagion, albeit regional. Dungey and Martin
(2007) confirmed volatility co-movements among
the Asian economies in both the stock and the
currency markets. Similarly, Huidrom et al. (2017)
find spillover effects among emerging markets using a vector autoregressive model. On the other
hand, Corsetti et al. (2005) find evidence that financial contagion in other markets does not exist
in their sample.

these six markets display varying tail dependence
in terms of intensity and dynamics. McDonald
et al. (2015) construct financial stress indices for
Eurozone countries by implementing multivariate
analysis (VAR models). In this manner, they can
model the interactions between the root causes
of systemic risk in the Eurozone. They find that
systemic risk in the sample economies is mostly
responsive to own-country financial shocks, even
though shocks from neighboring countries may
also be propagated to a certain extent. Polyzos et
al. (2018) show that systemic risk could also stem
from governance issues related to each banking institution. On the other hand, Zimmer (2014) proposes a copula-based approach to model co-movements in house prices and finds that conflicting
results between the US and other OECD countries. He shows that US house prices in different
areas exhibit simultaneous co-movements, while
this is not true for the rest of the world. In general, the literature recognizes relationships in financial markets as non-linear (Anufriev et al., 2018).
Pantos et al. (2019) show that volatility spillovers
are also present in electricity markets.

Even though a wide range of methodologies has
been used, economists do not seem to agree on a
single empirical procedure to identify contagion.
Several studies try to model the various channels that may transmit the spread and quantify
contagion using various econometric techniques.
Among these techniques, Engle (2002) proposes
the dynamic conditional correlation Generalized
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
(DCC-GARCH) model to overcome the limitations of previous methodologies on financial contagion. The main issue is the heteroscedasticity
Zhou and Gao (2010) analyze the tail depend- problem when estimating the time-varying condience of six major real estate securities markets to tional correlations. Several other authors attempt
monitor the co-movements using Symmetrized to extend this methodology and propose various
Joe-Clayton (SJC) copula. The results showed that modifications (Aielli, 2013; Samitas et al., 2020;
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Cho & Parhizgari, 2009; M. Pesaran & B. Pesaran, that the wealth effect could be the main source of
2007; Cappiello et al., 2006; Rigobon & Sack, 2003; contagion. Similarly, Hemche et al. (2016) investigate the contagion hypothesis between the US and
Billio & Pelizzon, 2003).
10 different stock markets during the GFC period.
Following the GFC period in 2008, many recent They show dynamic correlations between the US
studies use dynamic conditional correlations and most markets in their sample increased afto examine financial contagion. Hwang (2014) ter the GFC. Several other studies follow Engle’s
employs a DCC-GARCH model to examine the (2002) methodology and other variations of multransmission of the negative effects of GFC from tivariate GARCH models to test for financial conthe US to four Latin American stock markets and tagion (Sikhosana & Aye, 2018; Rajwani & Kumar,
confirm the contagion effect, as attested by the 2015; Bekiros, 2014; Wang, 2013; Celik, 2012).
increased magnitude and volatility of conditional correlations during the GFC period. B. Kim Some studies also take into account the Greek
and S. Kim (2013) also test for negative spillovers crisis. Tamakoshi and Hamori (2013) employ an
of the GFC towards Korea and other neighbor- asymmetric DCC model on five significant banking financial markets using DCC-GARCH. They ing institutions in Europe, exposed to Greek sovdemonstrate that the GFC shocks were transmit- ereign bonds. They find a significant burst in
ted domestic financial markets (increased corre- time-varying correlations between the returns
lation coefficients) and further weakened them. of these banks’ shares in the period following
Ahmad et al. (2013) use dynamic conditional the EDC period. Following the same framework,
correlations and examine the financial contagion Kenourgios (2014) studies both US and European
of PIIGS1 on BRIICKS2 countries. The results in- stock markets during the GFC and the EDC in
dicate a contagion effect, both from BRIICKS to terms of volatility contagion. The results indicate
PIIGS and vice versa, albeit not among all the the existence of contagion in cross-market volatilicountries in the sample.
ties, which are significantly increased during these
periods. The DCC approach has also been used by
Following the same framework, Kenourgios and numerous other researchers when examining conDimitriou (2014) and Karanasos et al. (2016) pro- tagion during the GFC and the EDC (Chiang et al.,
pose the FIAPARCH–DCC model to test for pos- 2014; Kazi & Wagan, 2014; Liow, 2012).
sible contagion effects of the GFC. Both studies find significant spillover effects and volatility
dependence across neighboring stock markets 2. METHODS
and among regional financial and non-financial
sectors. However, Dimitriou et al. (2013) study 2.1. Data
BRIICs using the FIAPARCH–DCC methodology
and cannot find any specific pattern of contagion. To measure the conditional correlations between
Greece and Cyprus and present the significance
Among other studies that use dynamic condi- of the evidence, the data must first be split into
tional correlations to test for financial contagion, two major subgroups. The sample is divided inAnastasopoulos (2018) examines contagion effects to two periods. The first period covers the 2008
from the Greek debt crisis and the Yuan devalu- Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the second the
ation on key trading partners and finds limited Eurozone Debt Crisis (EDC). The GFC covers the
persistent effects in the Greek case. Petmezas and period from 4 January 2005 up to 31 December
Santamaria (2014) investigate crisis transmission, 2009, while the EDC period includes the dates
both locally and internationally, by analyzing from 4 January 2010 until 30 June 2015, which is
stock-bond relationships in the US and the EU be- the date that the Greek capital market closed after
fore and during the GFC and the European Debt the enforcement of capital controls (see Samitas
Crisis (EDC) of 2007–2012. Their findings suggest & Polyzos, 2016 for a more detailed discussion).
1
2

PIIGS countries: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain.
BRIICKS countries: Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, South Korea, and South Africa.

http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.17(4).2020.12

123

Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 17, Issue 4, 2020

Furthermore, the sample contains daily returns
of stocks indices from the Greek and the Cypriot
market. It is considered that the EDC period was
an internal issue for Greece and Cyprus and not
a Eurozone problem. Major banks, credit rating
institutions, and Eurozone members determined
this problem as an individual problem of Greece
and Cyprus, which later became a Eurozone problem despite their expectations.

2.2. Methodology

0 if rt −1 ≥ µ
1 if rt −1 < µ
and α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, ω > 0.

where I t −1 = 

Many authors support the assumption that the
GJR-GARCH model captures the increased impact
on variance at time t of negative shocks at time t−1
compared to positive shocks. This asymmetry is
known as the leverage effect. The negative shock
produces increased risk, and this means that this
particular model can capture a higher number of
lags in conditional variance [GJR-GARCH (p, q)]:

The paper uses the DCC model of Engle (2002) to
test the behavior of correlations between the Greek
and the Cypriot stock markets. A major advantage
p
q
2
2
of this model is the ability to test for dependence
σt =
ω + (α + γ I t −1 ) ε t −1 + βσ t2−1. (3)
=i 1 =j 1
in different time series. Until now, the literature
includes a variety of models to investigate the con- The suggestion here is to model ε t = σ t zt , where
tagion phenomenon and spillover effects. The lit- zt is i.i.d. The best model is selected using the
erature review shows that in most cases, the DCC Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike
model permits researchers to obtain robust results, Information Criterion (AIC). The DCC model
particularly when there are asymmetries in the differs only in allowing Rt being time-varying.
data. The DCC model is an appropriate specifica- Therefore, Engle’s DCC model is expressed as
tion for quantifying the interdependence among follows:
markets because it is flexible and allows time-var(4)
H t = Dt Rt Dt ,
ying correlations and covariance matrixes.

∑

( )

∑

* −1

( )

* −1

Qt Qt
Engle (2002) proposes the Dynamic Conditional where Rt = Qt
Correlation (DCC) model, which he presented as a generalization of Bollerslev’s Constant and Qt= 1 − α (1) − β (1)  Γ +
Conditional Correlation (CCC) model (Bollerslev,
+α ( L )ηt −1ηt′−1 + β ( L ) Qt −1 ,
1990). The covariance matrix H t of Bollerslev’s
model has the following form:
where α and β are the scalar parameters like an
(1) ordinary GARCH model. Qt* is a diagonal maH t = Dt Rt Dt ,
trix with a square root of the ith diagonal of Qt
where Dt = diag hi ,t is the diagonal ma- on its ith diagonal position. Namely, in the Qt matrix of the conditional standard deviations and trix, the model estimates the elements of correlaRt = ρi , j ,t is the correlation matrix. The ex- tions calculated by the coefficients. As discussed
pressions h are estimated with univariate GARCH in Engle (2002), the R parameterizations have
models for each return series. In this paper, the the same requirements as those of H , with the
Glosten-Jagannathan-Runkle GARCH (GJR- exception that the conditional variances must be
GARCH) model of Glosten et al. (1993) is em- at unity. This methodology enables researchers
ployed. The GJR-GARCH model is appropriate to quantify the dependence between the two crifor capturing any asymmetry and excess kurto- ses and the other markets. This model is quite fasis in the data, particularly when indices fail the miliar and useful in quantifying the dependence
assumptions of normal distribution. The GJR- and the contagion phenomenon used by many auGARCH model assumes the following form:
thors (Jithendranathan, 2005; Gupta & Donleavy,
2009; Gjika & Horváth, 2013) because it captures
(2) time-varying conditional correlations between fiσ t2 =ω + (α + γ I t −1 ) ε t2−1 + βσ t2−1 ,
nancial indices.

{

{
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3. RESULTS

Consequently, based on these preliminary findings, an AR(1)-GJR-GARCH model is apposite to
capture asymmetry and excess kurtosis in both
3.1. Descriptive statistics
indices. Furthermore, both indices exhibit ARCH
The summary statistics of the data are demonstrat- effects, with the null hypothesis that no ARCH efed in Table 1. Both indices (Greece and Cyprus) fect is rejected uniformly for up to 5 lags.
are negatively skewed in the GFC period, while
they are positively skewed in the EDC period. 3.2. Empirical results
Likewise, both indices have kurtosis higher than
3 in the GFC period. However, in the EDC period, The estimations of the DCC model are presentonly Cyprus exceeds kurtosis higher than 3, while ed in Table 2 and Table 3 in a two-stage process.
the Greek index scores 2.7289. In both periods, the Table 2 presents the univariate estimations AR(1)
Cyprus market demonstrates the lowest and high- – GJR GARCH (1,1) for both indices. The g coeffiest average returns. However, at the same time, cient, which shows the leverage effect, is signifithis market demonstrates the highest volatility, as cant only in the case of Greece in the GFC period.
attested by the increased values in standard de- This guarantees the absence of normality in the
viation. The Jarque-Bera test statistic shows that index. However, in all other cases, the absence of
neither of the two indices is normally distributed. normality is not strong enough.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics – Global Financial Crisis and Eurozone Debt Crisis
EDC period

GFC period

Statistic
Mean

Greece

Cyprus

Greece

Cyprus

–0.0003

0.0004

–0.0009

–0.0021

Maximum

0.1028

0.1212

0.1637

0.1696

Minimum

–0.0980

–0.1214

–0.1384

–0.1553

Std. Dev.

0.0186

0.0237

0.0273

0.0305

Skewness

–0.2176

–0.0576

0.2332

0.2248

Kurtosis

4.3864

3.7505

2.7289

4.5761

Jarque-Bera

983.62

712.78

423.16

1167.2

Probability

[0.0000]

[0.0000]

[0.0000]

[0.0000]

Observations
ARCH(5) test

1215

1215

1325

1325

51.612

28.992

11.055

15.993

[0.0000]

[0.0000]

[0.0000]

[0.0000]

Table 2. Univariate estimations AR(1) – GJR GARCH (1,1)
Model
Cst(M)
AR(1)
Cst(ω)
ARCH(Alpha1)
GARCH(Beta1)
GJR(Gamma1)

Model
Cst(M)
AR(1)
Cst(ω)
ARCH(Alpha1)
GARCH(Beta1)
GJR(Gamma1)

Coefficient

GFC period
Greece
Std. Error
t-value
t-prob

0.0004
0.0891
0.0359
0.0482
0.8770
0.1276

Coefficient

0.0004
0.0299
0.0142
0.0174
0.0236
0.0360

1.080
2.975
2.524
2.770
37.080
3.543

0.2802
0.0030
0.0117
0.0057
0.0000
0.0004

EDC period
Greece
Std. Error
t-value
t-prob

–0.0005
0.0458
0.1620
0.0496
0.9111
0.0389
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0.0007
0.0334
0.1025
0.0239
0.0310
0.0292

–0.720
1.372
1.581
2.078
29.360
1.333

0.4714
0.1703
0.1142
0.0379
0.0000
0.1829

Cyprus
Coefficient Std. Error t-value
0.0016
0.1163
0.0518
0.0905
0.8745
0.0685

0.0005
0.0311
0.0373
0.0279
0.0420
0.0508

3.341
3.741
1.389
3.242
20.81
1.348

Cyprus
Coefficient Std. Error t-value
–0.0005
0.1630
0.0078
0.2131
0.8667
–0.0827

0.0003
0.0461
0.0057
0.0531
0.0169
0.0634

–1.491
3.535
1.366
4.011
51.14
–1.304

t-prob
0.0009
0.0002
0.1650
0.0012
0.0000
0.1778

t-prob
0.1362
0.0004
0.1721
0.0001
0.0000
0.1924
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Figure 1. Stock market returns (GFC period)

Figure 2. Stock market returns (EDC period)
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Figure 3. Univariate conditional variances (GFC period)

Figure 4. Univariate conditional variances (EDC period)
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Table 3. Dynamic conditional correlations (Greece – Cyprus)
Statistic

GFC period
Coefficient
Std. Error

Uncon. Corr
Alpha
Beta

0.0464
0.0604
0.9378

Uncon. Corr
Alpha
Beta

0.8834
0.0328
0.9672

t-value

t-prob

0.7101
0.0173
0.0187

0.065
3.494
50.260

0.9479
0.0005
0.0000

0.0624
0.0087
0.0106

14.160
3.773
91.400

0.0000
0.0002
0.0000

EDC period

Figures 1 and 2 show the stock market returns for
both countries, for the GFC and the EDC periods.
Additionally, Figures 3 and 4 show the univariate
conditional variance for each index, again for each
period. It is clear from these last two graphs that
there exists significantly increased volatility from
the outbreak of the GFC in mid-2008 until mid-2013
when things seem to calm down. However, there is a
spike of increased volatility in 2015 for Greece, which
experiences political instability at that time.

conditional correlation is marginally lower in the
EDC period (0.5066). However, the standard deviation is higher in the second period (0.3512). In
all estimations, indices are negatively skewed and
platykurtic, while the Jarque-Bera test ensures the
absence of normality in correlations for both periods. Lastly, the GFC period shows lower maximum correlation values and higher minimums
compared to the EDC period.

Covariances and conditional correlations are
Table 3 shows the dynamic conditional correlations presented graphically in Figures 5 to 10 for each
of the two stock markets. The unconditional correla- period separately. Both metrics support the pation is statistically significant only in the case of the per’s assertions that there exists a close connecEDC period (0.883). The ARCH parameter α was tion between the two economies from 2008 to
higher in the GFC period (0.06), which means that 2013, the period that includes the GFC and the
shocks were significantly stronger in the first period subsequent crisis first in Greece (2010) and then
than in the second (0.034). On the other hand, the in Cyprus (2012–2013), but this connection is
GARCH parameter β was higher in the EDC period, limited after the implementation of the bail-in
which shows the extent of increased volatility in the in Cyprus.
market. It is evident that if terms a and b are positive,
and their sum is lower than one (a+b<1), this implies In the case of conditional correlation for the GFC
dynamic conditional correlations. As can be seen, period (Figure 7), the values start from the negathe results support the existence of correlations over tive region but display an upward trend until the
time and a contagion effect. Furthermore, the analy- peak value of 0.80. However, in the EDC period
sis shows a significant increase during the crash peri- (Figure 8), it can be observed that the behavior of
the correlation is completely different; from 2012
od among the indices.
onwards, the correlations show a negative trend
The descriptive statistics of the conditional cor- until they reach their lowest point in 2014, before
relations are presented in Table 4. The average only slightly rising again.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for correlations
Statistic
Mean
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability

128

GFC period

EDC period

0.5524
0.9020
–0.2288
0.2999
–0.7417
–0.6474
132.62
[0.0000]

0.5066
0.9401
–0.1519
0.3512
–0.4168
–1.4606
156.13
[0.0000]

http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.17(4).2020.12

Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 17, Issue 4, 2020

Figure 5. GFC covariance

Figure 6. EDC covariance

Figure 7. GFC correlations

Figure 8. EDC correlations

The two crises are faced differently by the Eurozone
since the Greek case was still underway when
the Cypriot crises erupted. Besides, the nature of
the problems and the structure of the economies
were vastly different. Thus, the Cyprus case was a
great opportunity to test-run the bail-in solution,
turning the depositors into bank shareholders.
However, the risk for Europe lays on Greek instability, which could be deepened by the interdependence of the two economies. However, by 2013
this interdependence was significantly decreased
(Figures 6 and 8), and, thus, it was now easier to
implement the bail-in in a shielded environment.
It is clear that Cyprus, being a small economy,
whose financial ties with the Eurozone were hindered, was an ideal case for a test implementation
of bail-in, which, it should be noted, has since been
adopted as the go-to solution for banking distress.

4. DISCUSSION
As a member of the European Economic
Community (EEC) from 1981, Greece enjoyed several advantages through development programs
provided by the European Union. During the last

http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.17(4).2020.12

decade, government policies led to a significant
public deficit due to the inefficient management
of the development programs. The 2004 Olympic
Games and the non-productive public sector increased the country’s obligations. These needs
were financed by bonds, the return on investment
ratio that was not adequate to cover the country’s costs. Tax evasion and political corruption
led the country to a financial dead end. The 2008
Global Financial Crisis revealed these problems
in the Greek economy and alerted hedge funds
and major credit rating firms that focused on the
Greek economy and its declining debt-worthiness.
Although the Eurozone seemed to be well secured,
credit default swaps (CDS) focused on Greece. The
consequences of these events forced the Greek
government to implement a series of harsh austerity measures to decrease its deficit and debt, which
at the end of 2009, according to Eurostat, were
15.2% and 126.8% of GDP, respectively (Figure 9).
The situation in Greece has since been characterized by an economic impasse, with rising unemployment and significant liquidity problems in the
banking sector. However, some of the core issues
of cooperation among the EU members did not
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Source: Eurostat.

Figure 9. Greek government debt as a percent of GDP
help achieve a swift response, and, thus, volatility remained in the European economic environment. Investors who bet on the Eurozone collapse
took advantage of the conflicting interests between its members and increased the pressure on
countries with high debt and deficits. This resulted in a debt crisis for South European countries
and Ireland, which was nightmarish for Greece
and the Eurozone as a whole. For Greece, the crisis was deepened by the inefficient banking sector
(Christopoulos et al., 2020) and corruption and
the poor functioning of government institutions

(Policardo & Carrera, 2018). Additionally, markets were still restless due to the global recession
that followed the US subprime crisis. Many other countries, including Belgium, UK, and France,
faced high debts and deficits. This resulted in an
extended recession in the Eurozone.
Following the Greek debt crisis, Cyprus was hit
by the domino effect of negative consequences. As
can be seen from Figure 10, the Cypriot economy
passed into a recessionary stage after 2009. The
country seemed to be well secured at the beginSource: World Bank, ECB.
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ning of the subprime crisis, but then a huge debt
crisis was triggered, which surpassed the average
level of the Eurozone. Some of these reasons were
non-performing loans, the exposure to the haircut
of the Greek government bonds, and the inability to raise liquidity from the markets to support
the financial sector. This resulted in an increase in
unemployment and a steep deterioration in output
in the tourism and shipping sectors. Consequently,
commercial properties declined by almost 30%,
and the banking sector faced liquidity problems
from the exposure (EUR 22 billion) to the Greek
private sector. The Cyprus crisis was different
from the Greek crisis as the initial problem was
the banking sector.

were struggling to recover from the subprime crisis and hedge the risk from the exposure. The involved and exposed stakeholders tried to confront
the threat at an early stage. Greece government
adopted many austerity measures (such as a 10%
cut to bonuses, freezes in public-sector salaries,
and increases in VAT) to increase savings and reduce the high government deficit. Unfortunately,
the measures were not enough, and the recession deepened even more while consumption decreased rapidly, and the government was unable
at this stage to stabilize tax revenue. All the upcoming rescue packages did not change the financial condition in Greece; tax collection inefficiency and delays in the public sector’s reconstruction
were the biggest challenges. Eurozone presented
a significant inability to successfully resolve the
problem in Greece, creating serious doubts about
the effectiveness of the program. Shortly after, the
Eurozone felt the pressure from the credit rating
firms. Hence, in January 2012, Standard & Poor’s
downgraded France (from AAA rating to AA+),
and this was the first shock in the Eurozone area.

Cyprus had a very low tax rate and has thus attracted many foreign investors, including many
Russians. As credit rating firms gradually downgraded their ratings for the Cypriot economy and
the liquidity problem came to surface, Russia offered an emergency loan of EUR 2.5 billion (at
a 4.5% interest rate) to Cyprus to cover its financial gap through the international markets.
Unfortunately, this solution did not solve the
problem since the loan did not include any funds
for the recapitalization of the banking sector after
the haircut of the Greek government bonds. The
multiple rating downgrades of the Cyprus economy led to financial suffocation and a liquidity
gap, which forced the government to ask for a bailout from the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF) on 25 June 2012. After several negotiations
with European regulators, they agreed for a bailout of EUR 10 billion on 25 March 2013. In return, Cyprus had to impose a 40% bank deposit
levy on all uninsured deposits above EUR 100,000
and merge its second-largest commercial bank,
Laiki Bank, into the largest commercial bank, the
Bank of Cyprus. The progression of events justifies the criticism imposes by some researchers that
the Eurozone was inherently unstable and would
bring about significant debt crises due to asymmetric effects (Beckworth, 2017).

As for the Cypriot financial crisis, the applied
bail-in model affected only the domestic economy
while the spillover effects to other countries were
significantly low. It was assumed that the program
of Cyprus was ineffective in the first place because
even three years after the applied measures, the
Cypriot economy presented negative GDP growth
and persistently high unemployment. On the other hand, major economies and investors had a
great opportunity to implement a new model in a
small country with low transmission effects. The
economy of Cyprus had a significant, well-organized banking sector, compared to the size of the
country, and foreigners (including many Russian
investors) had placed large amounts of money in
the local economy. Besides, the country invested
a lot in exploring natural gas in the maritime exclusive economic zone, and the agreements with
Israel and the USA were the next great challenge
to lead the economy to develop.

The core issue of the Eurozone in the Greek Debt
crisis was whether a small country that covers
2.5% of the Eurozone’s GDP could affect the whole
European region. This possible scenario forced the
Eurozone and the IMF to focus more on this direction. In the meantime, most developed economies

The austerity measures implemented in Greece
did not provide any flexibility to increase the
GDP and simultaneously decrease the deficit
to a sustainable level. This was the first time a
Eurozone country faced such a severe financial
crisis that was intercorrelated with the unified

http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.17(4).2020.12

131

Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 17, Issue 4, 2020

currency. The threat of financial contagion led
the members of the Eurozone and investors and
governments to study and carefully monitor the
possibility of a domino effect from Greece to
other countries or channels of the economy, especially that period after the 2009 and beginning
of the European Debt crisis. In case of a “Grexit,”
some may have anticipated great losses to several major economies, which would be difficult
to calculate that period. In the pessimistic scenario, the EU could face several attempts from
its members to withdraw from the Eurozone area, with the rest of the PIIGS countries being

the first in line. The pending (at the time) decision for Brexit deepened this risk (Polyzos et
al., 2020). Despite claims and reassurances from
EU policymakers that the financial condition in
the Eurozone was tranquil, stock markets were
strongly interconnected with rumors and negative information. Thus, a possible domino effect was feasible and persisted long before the
stability gained ground. It is reasonable to conclude that the Greek debt crisis was similar to
Italy and Portugal, while the banking crisis in
Cyprus resembles those of Ireland, Spain, and
Iceland.

CONCLUSION
In this study, a DCC model was applied to study interdependence during the Greek debt crisis and the
Cypriot financial crisis. In line with existing literature (Suleman et al., 2017), the paper’s findings show
increased volatility during the outbreak of the two crises. The current work also shows that the correlation between the two stock markets was strong and increased up to approximately 2013. However, after
the emergence of the Cyprus banking crisis, this correlation was significantly decreased. These findings
are in line with similar literature on the topic (Samitas & Kampouris, 2019).
Following this, the European authorities chose to implement the bail-in solution to the Cypriot crisis to
test the results in a protected environment. As a small country and economy, Cyprus seemed to not have
the power to produce spillover effects on bigger economies, except through the Greek economy. Since
the correlation with Greece was decreased, the path was henceforth open. Therefore, it can be assumed
that Cyprus was used as a test case to measure the effectiveness of bail-ins as a solution to banking sector stress, without the risk of further impact on the Eurozone. Besides, the implementation of the bailins served as a deterrent for banks and local authorities alike to avoid risky behavior or loose banking
oversight.
In terms of suggestions to policymakers, the outcome of the experiment seems to be successful. The
bail-in solution was tested, and, despite the hard consequences for both the Cypriot and the Greek
economies, the effects on the rest of the Eurozone were minimal. The bail-in was deemed successful and
thus was adopted by the European authorities to the preferred solution when banks are under duress,
although other studies (e.g., Samitas & Polyzos, 2015) have not supported a positive outcome in all scenarios. However, the results show how policy measures can also effectively reduce the interdependence
of small economies, even in cases where there are strong historical ties. This could suggest that other
small economies in Europe are, potentially, at risk of being used as test cases for new measures, particularly if they display strong interdependence with only one small European economy. If governments are
to protect their local economies from such experiments, diversification of economic ties is the proposed
solution. This could be of particular interest to the currently developing economies of Central Europe.
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